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Abstract 
 
This paper examines two important issues related to bank mergers in India. First, we estimate 
potential economic gains of state owned banks if they undergo consolidation. Scale economies, 
returns to scale and profit efficiency of state owned banks during 1986 to 2003 are estimated 
based on stochastic frontier analysis. We find that many Indian banks exhibit potential cost 
savings from mergers provided they rationalize their branch networks although profit efficiency 
may not rise immediately. Second we measure the realized impact of bank mergers on 
shareholders‟ wealth based on event study analysis. We find that in the case of forced mergers, 
shareholders of neither the bidder nor the target banks benefited. In the case of voluntary 
mergers, the bidder banks‟ shareholders gained more than the target banks‟ shareholders.  
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EFFICIENCY, SCALE ECONOMIES AND VALUATION EFFECTS: EVIDENCE 
FROM BANK MERGERS IN INDIA 
 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions have become an important strategy of the global financial services 
industry during the last fifteen years. Over 10,000 financial firms underwent acquisitions in the 
major industrialized countries from 1990 to 2001 and the figure was 15,500 worldwide (Amel et 
al., 2004). The key driving force for this activity is severe competition among firms of the same 
industry, which puts focus on economies of scale, cost efficiency and profitability. The other 
motive for mergers is enhancing shareholders‟ wealth. Many studies (e.g. see the review by 
Berger and Humphrey, 1994) have evaluated such merger benefits, specific to the banking 
sectors of the US, UK, Japan and European countries. However, research evidence on mergers in 
emerging markets is scarce. This paper tries to fill this gap by analyzing mergers in the Indian 
banking sector.   
 
The paper examines two important issues related to bank mergers in India, viz. an ex ante issue 
in anticipation of mergers and an ex post issue of realized mergers. First, we estimate potential 
scale benefits in Indian banking industry considering all the state owned banks, which constitute 
more than 70% of the assets of banking industry. The benefits from consolidation are 
intrinsically related to the existence of scale economies. Thus, expanding the scale of operations 
through a merger (or takeover) is expected to fetch substantial cost savings. Hence, while 
examining the potential benefits from consolidation, it becomes imperative to investigate 
whether state owned banks in India exhibit scale economies. If they do, then there is a case for 
cost savings out of consolidation. Accordingly, we examine scale economies of state owned 
banks using data set for the period 1986 to 2003 by estimating a stochastic cost frontier and 
computing the Ray scale economies and returns to scale. Our results indicate significant 
reduction in costs, provided the banks go for rationalisation of their branch networks.  The 
reduction in costs are expected to be significant for smaller banks, rather than for large banks. 
However, the analysis fails to show any evidence of immediate improvement in profit efficiency. 
To reap the main benefits of cost reduction through mergers, our study strongly recommends 
rationalisation of branch networks of the state-owned banks.  
 
The second issue we examine is the impact of mergers on the wealth of shareholders of Indian 
banks. For this, we conduct event study analysis of forced and voluntary mergers. Mergers are 
usually market-driven. But in the Indian context, most of the bank mergers are forced mergers 
with the intervention of regulatory authority, viz. the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This offers a 
unique case study, which is not observable in the developed countries. Some emerging markets 
such as Malaysia have already witnessed forced mergers and some others having state-owned 
banks are likely to witness forced mergers. Hence, the conclusions drawn from this study would 
be useful to strengthen the evidence on forced mergers and provide insights to policy makers in 
effective implementation of merger schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to analyse scale economies in Indian bank mergers, which constitutes a pre-merger analysis and 
then examine the impact of mergers on shareholders‟ wealth, which forms a post merger 
analysis.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the Indian 
banking system and the merger trends. In Section 3, we briefly review the theoretical literature 
and empirical evidence on bank consolidation. Next in Section 4, we present an econometric 
exercise wherein we estimate the cost function for Indian state owned banks and compute the 
economies of scale, returns to scale and profit efficiency. In Section 5, we analyze the impact of 
mergers on shareholders‟ wealth by conducting event study analysis. Finally in Section 6, we 
summarize the entire discussion and conclude the paper. 
2. Indian Banking System and Merger Trends 
The Indian commercial banking system comprises of state-owned banks (known as public sector 
banks), private banks as well as branches of foreign banks operating in India. The first two 
decades of the financial system in post-independent India (1947-69) were fairly liberal, with 
limited controls on credit and interest rates. However, the main criticism of the banking policy 
during this period was poor allocation of resources to larger parts of India and that the savings 
potential of households was not fully exploited. As a consequence, the Government of India 
acquired the ownership of twenty erstwhile private banks in 1969 and 1980 and exercised control 
over credit allocation, interest rates and enhanced both primary and secondary reserve ratios. The 
Government tightened its control over the credit allocation process to ensure adequate credit 
flow into industrial and agricultural activities in conformity with national level economic plan 
priorities. In addition to acquisition of control over commercial banks, the Government also 
promoted certain development banks catering to various segments of industry and agriculture.  
The controlled regime of Indian banking has achieved tangible results of increase in per capita 
deposits and credits and widening of banking services to rural and semi-urban areas with the 
opening up of branches (Table-I). Large scale economic activity has been brought under the 
preview of organised banking system. Since nationalization, the banking system was dominated 
by public sector banks, which accounted for over 90% of total commercial banking assets, and 
around 85% of bank branches; the number of private and foreign banks remained stagnant and 
their branch expansion was restricted. The adverse impact of the controlled regime of banking 
was on the commercial parameters of banks such as profitability and solvency, which had 
completely taken a back seat, while social aspects dominated, resulting in an inefficient banking 
system. The competitive strength of Indian banks in global markets had declined substantially 
and the primary concern for the policy makers was strengthening of the banking system.  
 
In order to make the banking system profitable, efficient and resilient, the Government initiated 
the financial liberalisation process in 1992. Financial liberalisation was also an imperative to 
make Indian banks globally competitive. A comprehensive financial sector reforms package was 
suggested by a Government-appointed committee. This committee‟s recommendations include, 
among others, introduction of prudential accounting and capital adequacy norms, deregulation of 
interest rates, greater autonomy in day-today operations, disinvestment of shares of government 
owned banks, flexible entry norms for opening up of private sector banks  and consolidation of 
banks through mergers and acquisitions.     
 
Although widely discussed as being among the recent developments, mergers are however not a 
totally new phenomena in Indian banking. During the period 1961-68, 46 bank mergers took 
place in India. Many small banks were unable to operate at profitable levels, mainly due to small 
size and so these were merged with other healthy banks (see Table-II). But mergers have recently 
gained importance since 2000, when the first market driven merger viz. the acquisition of Times 
Bank by HDFC bank took place. In the process of strengthening the financial sector, the RBI has 
envisaged consolidation of banks through mergers and acquisitions. On introduction of 
prudential accounting and capital adequacy norms, many small private sector banks have shown 
the symptoms of sickness such as huge amount of Non Performing Assets (NPAs), decline in 
capital adequacy ratio substantially below the mandatory level of 8 percent and low profitability. 
In order to avoid serious runs of these banks and to protect the depositors‟ interests, the RBI has 
merged these troubled banks with other healthy public and private sector banks. We refer to 
these as forced mergers. In the forced mergers, the RBI prepares the merger plans, which are 
implemented by the acquiring bank. The acquiring bank has limited choice over implementation 
of the merger scheme. Interestingly, all these bidder banks are listed on the stock exchange and 
Government of India is typically the major shareholder. Hence, the impact of forced mergers on 
acquired bank‟s shareholders‟ wealth is also a serious concern from the corporate governance 
point of view. On the other hand, three private sector banks have voluntarily acquired other 
private banks as per their strategic considerations. These are referred to in this paper as voluntary 
mergers.  
 
Another category is the mergers of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) with banks. Over a 
period, several DFIs have been part of the Indian financial system. These were established with 
an objective of improving allocation efficiency of resources to various segments of the economy. 
But due to the flexibility provided to banks by the RBI in the deregulated scenario, especially in 
credit delivery, banks have widened their loan portfolio to project finance, long term loans and 
other specialised sectoral financing. This made the presence of DFIs redundant. An RBI 
appointed Working Group (RBI, 1998) suggested that these institutions should explore the 
possibility of gainful mergers with different sets of financial entities like banks and DFIs based 
on commercial considerations. The related merger of ICICI (an erstwhile DFI) with ICICI bank 
has been considered as a „mega merger‟ in the Indian context. This increased the size of ICICI 
bank‟s assets from INR 1,97,366 million to INR 10,49,590 million which is almost a five-time 
increase.
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 We prefer to group these mergers in the category of forced mergers due to the 
intervention of the regulator in these cases. The public sector banks have not witnessed mergers 
among themselves. However, on several occasions, policy makers have indicated that the 
banking sector will be consolidated by merging the public sector banks and have emphasized on 
a transformation of the banking system “from a regime of large number of small banks to small 
number of large banks” (Leeladhar, 2005). Hence, public sector banks are the right candidates to 
analyse potential benefits such as scale economies of mergers. This motivates our analysis of the 
potential benefits from merger of public sector banks- before we move on to assess the impact of 
realized mergers involving private banks.  
 
3. Review of Literature 
Extant empirical literature on bank mergers can be broadly categorized into two streams. One 
stream of the literature has looked into ex ante issues such as rationale, scope and potential 
candidates of mergers. The other is related to ex post issues such as impact of mergers on 
shareholder value and bank performance. 
 
Ex ante issues: Laderman (2000) explores potential diversification benefits to be had from banks 
merging with non-banking financial service firms. Simulated mergers between US banks and 
non-bank financial service firms show that investment in insurance underwriting and securities 
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brokerage are optimal for reducing the probability of bankruptcy for bank-holding companies. 
Wheelock and Wilson (2004) find that expected merger activity in US banking is positively 
related to management rating. Other factors such as bank size and position of a bank as a lead 
bank of the holding company also positively influence merger activity. Increase in core deposits 
and some indicators of asset risk raise the expected number of mergers. The study also finds that 
regulatory approval process serves as a constraint on merger activity. Supervisory evaluations of 
bank performance affect mergers. Expected merger activity is negatively related to market 
concentration and positively related to whether a bank is located in an urban market. Substantial 
gains from mergers are expected to come from cost savings owing to economies of scale and 
scope. In a survey of US studies, Berger and Humphrey (1994) concluded that the consensus 
view of the recent scale economy literature is that the average cost curve has a relatively flat U-
shape, with only small banks having the potential for scale efficiency gains and the measured 
economies are usually relatively small. Studies on scope economies found no evidence of these 
economies. Based on the literature, Berger and Humphrey conclude that “synergies in joint 
products in banking are rather small.” 
 
Ex post issues: On the market value effects of mergers, Pilloff and Santomero (1997) conduct a 
survey of the empirical evidence and report that most studies fail to find a positive relationship 
between merger activity and gains in either performance or stockholder wealth. But studies by 
Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Hannan and Wolkan 
(1989), Hawawini and Swary (1990), Neely (1987), and Trifts and Scanlon (1987) report a 
positive reaction in the stock prices of target banks and a negative reaction in the stock prices of 
bidding banks to merger announcements. A recent study on mergers of Malaysian banks shows 
that, forced mergers have destroyed wealth of acquired banks (Chong Beng-Soon et al., 2006). 
Berger and Humphrey (1994) reported that most studies that examined pre-merger and post-
merger financial ratios found no impact on operating cost and profit ratios. However financial 
ratios may be misleading indicators of performance because they do not control for product mix 
or input prices. On the other hand they may also confuse scale and scope efficiency gains with 
what is known as X-efficiency gains. Recent studies have explicitly employed frontier X-
efficiency methods to determine the X-efficiency benefits of bank mergers. Most of the US 
based studies concluded that there is considerable potential for cost efficiency benefits from bank 
mergers (since there exists substantial X-inefficiency in the industry), “but the data show that on 
an average, such benefits were not realized by the US mergers of the 1980s” (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1994).  
In sum, the international evidence does not provide strong evidence on merger benefits in the 
banking industry. In this paper, we first examine the ex ante issue of potential cost benefits from 
mergers in the context of Indian banking in the next section. Subsequently, we take up the ex 
post issue of the impact of realized mergers on shareholders‟ wealth. 
4. Scale Economies and Efficiency 
Estimation methodology and data 
Our analysis of potential scale economies is based on estimation of a bank‟s cost function of the 
following type: 
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where C is operating costs, Y is the vector of outputs and W is the vector of input prices. The 
sub-scripts i and t represent bank and year, respectively. 
What constitutes bank output is a matter of intense debate in the banking literature. The issue 
essentially boils down to the question of whether or not to include deposits as part of bank 
output. We follow the value-added approach, which has been frequently used in Indian studies 
(see Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003 and Sensarma, 2006). In other words, our output vector 
consists of three categories of deposits, viz. fixed, saving and current deposits, investments and 
loans. The inputs in the production technology are considered to be labour and capital. The price 
of labor (W1) is defined as the ratio of established expenses to total employees.  The price of 
capital (W2) is measured as the ratio of capital expenses to fixed assets. All nominal variables 
are converted to real by taking them at 1993-94 prices. 
In order to estimate the cost function, we assume the following translog form: 
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Next, we impose certain theoretically desirable properties. We apply the usual symmetry 
restrictions, that follow from Young‟s theorem, aml=alm and bjk=bkj. To ensure linear 
homogeneity in W, the following restrictions are imposed: 

j
bj =1, 
j
bjk =0  k, 
j
amj =0 m, 
j
bjt =0. 
Cost and input prices are normalised by the price of capital before taking logarithms to impose 
linear input price homogeneity. The estimation of the cost function can be done in several ways. 
While regression method seems to be the most obvious choice, its applicability in banking data 
has been criticised in the literature. Regression method would implicitly assume that all banks 
are equally efficient, which is not so in reality (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). To overcome this 
problem, stochastic frontier analysis is popularly used in the literature to estimate the cost 
function. While there are various versions of this methodology, we use the one given by Battese, 
Coelli and Colby (1989). The error term in the cost equation is assumed to have two parts as 
follows: 
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The random error is Vit ~ iid N (0,
2
V ), and the inefficiency term is Uit ~ non-negative truncation 
of independently distributed N(  , 2σ ). Estimation of the parameters and cost function 
coefficients is done through the maximum likelihood technique. For this purpose, we use the 
software FRONTIER version 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). 
 
Having estimated the coefficients of the cost function, we compute economies of scale by the 
Ray Scale Economies (RSCE) measure which is given as, ),,(),,( tWYtWY m
m
   where 
),,( tWYm  is cost elasticity of the m
th
 output. This measure tells us whether, consequent to an 
equi-proportionate increase in outputs produced, the cost goes up by more than or less than the 
increase in outputs. If the increase in costs is less (more), then the bank is said to exhibit scale 
economies (diseconomies). We also compute Returns to scale (RTS), which is given by the 
inverse of ),,(1 tWY . Depending on whether the RTS is greater than or less than one, the 
bank would be characterized by increasing returns to scale (indicating scale economies) or 
decreasing returns to scale (indicating scale diseconomies). 
We make two sets of estimations, one by including branches as output in the cost function, and 
one excluding branches. The former would give us estimates of scale economies considering an 
increase in number of branches, along with all other outputs, and the latter would denote the case 
of unchanged number of branches (e.g. branch rationalization), but expansion of all other 
outputs, during consolidation.  
For the purpose of estimating scale economies, we collect data on all 27 Public Sector Banks 
(PSBs) over the period 1986-2003, collated from various issues of Financial Analysis of Banks 
and Performance Highlights of Banks published by the Indian Banks‟ Association. The 27 PSBs 
comprise of the largest bank in India, viz. the State Bank of India (SBI), its 7 associates (small 
banks owned by the SBI) and 19 other nationalized banks. Based on this data, we estimate the 
cost function and compute scale economies and returns to scale for each bank in each year. The 
results are discussed below. 
 
Scale economies, Cost gains Vs Revenue gains: Analysis of results 
Values of RSCE and RTS are computed for each PSB in each year. We present below the mean 
values over the years in Table III and the values for individual banks in the last year of our data 
set in Table IV. When branches are included in the output vector, the values of RSCE is greater 
than one and those of RTS are less than one for all years. This indicates that expansion of bank 
size accompanied with an increase in the number of branches, would not lead to cost savings. On 
the other hand, the corresponding values when branches are excluded are less than one in the 
case of RSCE and greater than one in the case of RTS. This indicates that if banks increase their 
size while maintaining their present number of branches, then there could be cost savings. In 
other words, in case PSBs go for size expansion, it should be done without increasing the number 
of branches. This finding was earlier observed by Srivastava (2000) who concluded that the 
number of branches are too high and “many of these branches are under-utilized, unable to 
generate large volume of deposits or loans” (Srivastava, 2000). 
Thus, rationalisation of branches is going to be a key factor in consolidation of PSBs. If merger 
of banks is not followed by closure of redundant branches, then there will not be any cost savings 
from mergers. This result is in line with international evidence. Numerous studies that did not 
consider size enhancement accompanied by branch expansion, concluded that banks exhibit scale 
economies in USA (Berger and Humphrey, 1994), Japan (Tadesse, 2006), Taiwan (Huang and 
Wang, 2004), Argentina (Guala, 2002) etc. However Berger and Humphrey (1994) criticize this 
approach and suggest allowing for branch expansion in the cost-function specification. When we 
do that, our results show that size expansion will not lead to cost gains.  
We now move to some bank-specific results. Table IV presents RSCE and RTS for individual 
banks for the last year in our sample, viz. 2003. Several interesting observations follow. If we 
consider the results with branches held constant, then most of the banks exhibit increasing 
returns to scale. Thus, there is a scope of increasing the size of these banks, provided the number 
of branches is kept constant. The cost savings from such an exercise are expected to be 
substantial, especially for the small banks. Most banks that exhibit low RSCE or high RTS are 
the smaller banks. In fact, the SBI associate banks appear to have the maximum cost saving 
potential, especially State Bank of Saurashtra, State Bank of Patiala, State Bank of Mysore, State 
Bank of Indore and State Bank of Travancore. This indicates that SBI‟s control over these banks 
stopped their organic growth which could have yielded them cost savings. Thus, there is a strong 
case for allowing these banks to grow, either by relaxing SBI‟s control over their growth, or by 
allowing them to merge among themselves or with other banks. This result is true even when we 
consider branch expansion, in which case these banks would have the least cost dis-savings out 
of an increase in size. Other banks which have the potential for size expansion are Corporation 
Bank, Canara Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC), Punjab & Sind Bank, Bank of India 
(BOI), Andhra Bank and Vijaya Bank. Most of these, (except for BOI and OBC) are relatively 
smaller banks. In fact, OBC was the government‟s choice of acquirer to merge the failed Global 
Trust Bank, a private bank. Our cost results seem to vindicate the government‟s choice in this 
regard. 
On the other hand, most of the banks that exhibit decreasing returns to scale were the big banks, 
viz. SBI, Punjab National Bank (PNB), Central Bank of India, United Bank of India, Dena Bank, 
Indian Bank and Allahabad Bank. These banks are operating beyond their optimal scale, which 
would minimise their average costs. Ray (2004) also recommends breaking up of SBI and PNB 
into smaller units. Thus, there is a case for rationalizing the size of the above mentioned banks 
and identifying them as non-candidates for mergers, based on the cost criteria.
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In order to ascertain the cost performance of a bank in a year, we can estimate a measure of cost 
efficiency based on the stochastic frontier. Cost efficiency measures the cost performance of a 
banking firm, relative to the best-practice (least-cost) bank that produces the same output under 
the same exogenous conditions. After estimating the stochastic cost frontier, the cost efficiency 
for bank i at time t is measured as the ratio between the minimum cost (Cmin) necessary to 
produce that bank‟s output and the actual cost (Cit): 
  )4(min 
it
it
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C
COSTEFF  
After computing the cost efficiency estimates, we conduct two specific inquiries. First, did banks 
gain from mergers in terms of cost efficiency? Second, are big banks more cost efficient than 
small banks? To answer the first question, we chose not to do a statistical analysis because of the 
very few cases of mergers during the period considered by us, relative to the sample size. 
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 Regressing RTS on size (taken as log of assets), we found a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the two variables. 
However, we looked at some specific cases of mergers, such as the spate of mergers in 1990 
involving Allahabad Bank, Indian Overseas Bank (IOB), Indian Bank and BOI. In case of 
Allahabad Bank and IOB, cost efficiency fluctuated in every year around the merger, thereby not 
revealing any clear trend (see Table V). Similarly, cost efficiency did not exhibit any clear trend 
in the mergers involving of Bank of Baroda (BOB), Union Bank of India and OBC. In the case 
of BOI and Indian Bank, cost efficiency declined in the years after the mergers. Thus, the 
evidence in this regard is inconclusive.  
However, costs are only one side of the story. While traditional academic research on banking 
focused on costs, recent interest has shifted to revenues (Berger and Mester, 2003). The rationale 
is that banks may indulge in costly practices with the purpose of making up for it through 
revenue gains. In the context of mergers, diversification of the loan portfolio may bring in 
additional revenues that would compensate for the cost dis-savings. Studies have shown that 
banks underwent an improvement in profit efficiency (estimated based on stochastic frontiers) 
subsequent to mergers (Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In order to examine this 
possibility in the case of Indian banks, we estimated profit efficiency of PSBs for the period 
1986-2003. The reason why profit efficiency is studied rather than simple financial ratios of 
profit performance is that financial ratios may give misleading indicators of performance, as they 
fail to control for product mix or input prices (Berger and Humphrey, 1994). 
Profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to attaining the maximum possible profit that a 
best-practice bank on the frontier earns, for given levels of input and output prices (quantities) 
and other exogenous conditions. The literature provides two different specifications for the profit 
maximization concept; viz. „standard‟ (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997) and „alternative‟ profit 
(Berger and Mester, 1997) functions. The standard (text book type) profit function assumes that 
banks maximize their profits by choosing the output quantities, while output and input prices are 
given. Alternative profit function assumes that banks can have some power in determining output 
prices and therefore, they maximize profits choosing the output prices, while output quantities 
and input prices are given. Thus, standard profit function is specified as a function of input and 
output prices, whereas alternative profit function is specified as a function of input prices and 
output quantities. Sensarma (2005) provides a discussion on why alternative profit is a more 
appropriate concept for Indian banking. Accordingly, we adopt alternative profit function rather 
than standard profit to study profit efficiency of Indian PSBs. 
The alternative profit specification employs the same set of exogenous variables as the cost 
function, with the only difference that profit replaces cost as the dependant variable in the 
frontier regression. Therefore, the alternative profit frontier is given by (subsuming cross-section 
and time subscripts): 
)5(),(  UVwygP  
Where P is the profit of the firm and the other variables are as explained before (all variables are 
in logarithms). Profit efficiency is measured by the ratio between the actual profit of a bank and 
the maximum possible profit that is achievable by the most efficient bank.   
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In other words, if profit efficiency score of a bank is say 90 percent, then it means that the bank 
is losing about 10 percent of its potential profits to X-inefficiency or managerial failure by 
choosing sub-optimal input quantities and outputs prices. Once again, we follow the Battese, 
Coelli and Colby (1989) methodology for estimating the profit frontier and subsequently 
computing profit efficiency. 
 
After computing the profit efficiency estimates, we conduct two specific inquiries. First, did 
banks gain from mergers in terms of profit efficiency? Second, are big banks more profit 
efficient than small banks? To answer the first question, we looked at some specific cases of 
mergers, such as the spate of mergers in 1990 involving Allahabad Bank, IOB, Indian Bank and 
BOI. In case of Allahabad Bank, profit efficiency declined in the next year and then fluctuated in 
every subsequent year thereby not revealing any clear trend. In the latter three cases, profit 
efficiency went up in the next year, but this increase was not sustained in the subsequent years 
(see Table VI). On the other hand, profit efficiency actually declined in the next year and picked 
up subsequently for the mergers involving Bank of Baroda and Union Bank of India in 2000. 
Another case is of OBC, which acquired two banks in 1998 and there seems to have been no 
impact on its profit efficiency. Thus, the evidence in this regard is inconclusive. Our findings do 
not support the expectation that profit performance of banks would go up subsequent to mergers. 
This hypothesis seems to be borne out for the Indian case when we analyzed the relationship 
between size and profit performance of PSBs, taking profit efficiency as our indicator of profit 
performance. 
Moving on to the relationship between size and profit efficiency, once again we do not find a 
clear relationship. For the year 2003, banks with high profit efficiency are not necessarily the 
large banks (see Table VI). In fact, small banks like some of the SBI Associates have high profit 
efficiency. Similarly, many big banks have poor profit performance in terms of profit efficiency.
3
 
  
The lessons from the above empirical analyses are as follows. PSBs are not expected to have cost 
gains from mergers, unless the exercise is accompanied by branch rationalization. The cost gains 
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 We did not find any statistically significant relationship between profit efficiency and size using regression 
technique. 
from mergers are expected to be most for small banks and the least for large banks. Finally, there 
is no conclusive evidence to suggest that mergers would bring any immediate improvement in 
profit performance. The implication of these results is that while the need for consolidation is not 
motivated by cost or revenue benefits, it would rather depend on other factors. Even in such a 
case, banks have to carefully implement the merger exercise, for example, by closing down 
redundant branches) in order to reap the merger benefits and to improve the bottom line. 
5. Bank Mergers and Market Valuation of Equity 
As mentioned before, Indian banking sector has witnessed two types of mergers. In the first type 
i.e. forced mergers initiated by the RBI, the main objective has been to protect the interests of 
depositors of weak banks. When a bank has shown symptoms of sickness such as huge NPAs, 
substantial erosion of net worth due that decline of capital adequacy ratio, RBI has intervened 
and merged the weak bank with a strong bank (Table VII). The second type of mergers is 
voluntary mergers with the motivation of market dynamics such as increasing size, 
diversification of portfolio, and exposure to new geographical markets. In all these cases, the 
acquirer banks have gained the advantage of branch network and customer clientele of the 
acquired banks. In this section, we analyze the impact of forced and voluntary mergers on 
shareholders‟ wealth.  
There have been eighteen cases of bank mergers during the period 1993 to 2006. Out of these, 
three were voluntary mergers. These were merger/ amalgamation of a private sector bank with 
another private sector bank purely driven by business considerations. We categorize the 
remaining fifteen cases were forced mergers. Among these fifteen, two cases involved 
convergence of DFIs into commercial banks. The objective here was to follow a universal bank 
model, which would offer a wide range of financial services. In the first case, ICICI Limited (a 
private sector DFI) has been merged with its subsidiary banking unit ICICI Bank Limited and the 
merged entity emerged as the largest private sector bank and as the second largest bank in India. 
In the second case, the Government decided to transform the public sector DFI, Industrial 
Development Bank of India (IDBI) into a commercial bank by having it acquire its subsidiary, 
viz. IDBI Bank Limited, which was a private sector bank. After the merger a new public sector 
commercial bank was formed. At the time of the mergers both the DFIs ICICI Limited and IDBI 
were in poor financial health, with huge NPAs and low profitability. Restructuring was essential 
and inevitable; hence there were regulatory interventions in the mergers involving these two 
institutions. We categorize these two mergers under forced mergers for the purpose of event 
study analysis. The remaining thirteen forced mergers were mergers of weak banks with existing 
public and private sector banks. Almost all the target banks in this category were small private 
sector banks, suffering with problems of capital adequacy, high NPAs and low profitability. We 
analyzed six such cases of forced mergers in the event study analysis. In the remaining cases, 
either the target and bidder banks were both unlisted, or the size of the target bank was 
substantially less than that of the bidder bank. Hence, these cases would carry little significance 
for our analysis of mergers.             
Event Study Analysis 
The event study methodology used in our analysis has been widely used in the literature in a 
variety of contexts (Mackinlay, 1997). To ensure that any information leakage is being captured, 
we allow the identified merger period (event window) to include four days before and four days 
after the merger (event). A similar window period was adopted by Chong Beng-Soon et al. 
(2006). We collected daily adjusted closing prices of stocks and the market index (Sensex) from 
CMIE Prowess,  which is a comprehensive financial database of Indian companies.  
We estimate Abnormal returns (AR), that indicate the additional impact on stock returns due to 
an event over and above normal market movements as follows: 
  )7( mtiitit RRAR   
where, Rit is the daily return on firm „i‟ on day„t‟ and Rmt is the return on the bench mark index, 
α and β are OLS regression parameters that are estimated using the market model, over the 
previous period  of 150 days. We estimate abnormal returns for both bidder and target banks and 
then test the significance of abnormal returns based on the Standard Errors (SE), as suggested by 
Mackinlay (1997): 
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In addition to the above, we also computed t-statistic for each day in the event window by 
estimating the SE suggested by Dodd and Warner (1983):  
2
1
2
2 )
)(
)(1
1()(













 


n
t mtmt
mtmt
it
RyR
RxR
n
SARSE
 
where, S
2 
is the variance of the market-model residuals, n is the number of days in the estimation 
period, Rmtx is the return on market index on t day of event window period, Rmty is the return on 
market index on t day of estimation period and Rmt is the mean return on market index of 
estimation period. 
Analysis of Results  
In four out of the six forced mergers that we examined, the shareholders of bidder banks 
appeared to have lost their market value of equity (Table VIII and Figure 1). However in the case 
of acquisition of ICICI Limited by ICICI bank, since it signaled the emergence of the largest 
private bank, ICICI Bank‟s shareholders‟ expectations went up with significant increase in 
abnormal returns. This is consistent with the findings of Anand and Singh (2008), who analyzed 
five merger cases in Indian banking.
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 Similarly, the acquisition of United Western Bank by IDBI 
had given a positive signal with abnormal gains to the bidder banks‟ shareholders, but the gains 
were statistically significant only on the third and fourth days following the merger 
announcement. In all other cases, the bidder banks‟ shareholders appear to have lost wealth upon 
merger with the weak banks. Especially in the case of acquisition of Global Trust Bank (GTB) 
by the Oriental Bank of Commerce, the bidder bank‟s shareholder‟s wealth declined from 8.34 
percent to 16.77 percent in the window period following the merger announcement. Forced 
mergers have not helped even the target banks (Figure 2). The GTB shareholders appear to have 
deeply discounted the merger. As the GTB episode was a serious crisis of bank failure, the 
merger had provided confidence to depositors but the merger announcement does not appear to 
have provided any relief to shareholders. In the case of Nedungadi Bank, the shareholders have 
gained significantly on the second day of the merger announcement but thereafter, no abnormal 
returns were found. United Bank shareholders seem to have marginally gained on announcement 
of merger with IDBI bank, but the abnormal returns were not statistically significant.  
Thus in all the cases of forced mergers, the shareholders of neither the bidder bank nor the target 
bank seem to have gained upon announcement of the merger. Further, the shareholders of bidder 
banks have lost their wealth when the merger announcement is perceived as a negative signal. 
Our results suggest that the regulator needs to rethink its policy of reviving weak banks through 
mergers. The RBI believes that merger of weak banks with strong banks is essential for 
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 Out of the five cases that they examined, Anand and Singh (2008) did not make any distinction between forced and 
voluntary mergers. 
restructuring of the banking system and is a desirable step in consolidating the financial sector. 
However, in most of the forced merger cases, the target banks were identified for acquiring the 
weak bank almost after the collapse of the latter. At that stage, the acquirer bank, under 
instructions from the RBI, was left without any other option. Instead of this procedure, the RBI 
should activate the Prompt Corrective Action system (PCA) and identify the weak banks on the 
basis of certain symptoms. This would help the bidder banks to choose target banks, based on 
strategic considerations, which is likely to benefit all the stakeholders. 
Turning to the cases of voluntary mergers, we find that in two out of the three voluntary merger 
cases, the gains to target banks‟ shareholders are higher than that of bidder banks (Table IX). 
Both the target and bidder banks‟ shareholders benefited upon announcement of the mergers. 
Thus, the stock markets welcomed mergers which would lead to enhanced growth prospects for 
the merged entity and therefore shareholders of both banks benefited out of such mergers (Figure 
3 and 4). Our analysis reveals that in the case of acquisition of Times Bank by HDFC bank, both 
banks‟ shareholders viewed it as a positive signal. A similar result was obtained by Anand and 
Singh (2008). At the time of the merger, Times Bank was suffering from low profitability and 
high NPAs; hence, the acquisition by HDFC bank provided relief to both shareholders and 
depositors of the bank. Similarly, HDFC bank gained out of the retail portfolio of Times Bank 
and subsequently emerged as the largest private sector bank in India in 1999. ICICI Bank 
increased its size by acquiring BOM and reached the position of a large size bank among the 
private sector banks way back in 2000. Our analysis shows that upon the announcement of this 
merger, there was a significant rise in abnormal returns, leading to increase in value for 
shareholders of BOM. But the shareholders of ICICI bank did not achieve any gains. This is not 
surprising, because shareholders of a troubled bank stand to gain from a merger with a strong 
bank, whereas the same may not be good news from the perspective of the strong acquiring bank. 
In the case of amalgamation of Bank of Punjab with Centurion Bank, the amalgamation was an 
inevitable restructuring for both the banks, as both intended to grow but experienced dismal 
performance. Both the banks came forward to build a growth-oriented bank on the basis of each 
other‟s strengths. Centurion Bank was active in western part of India, whereas Bank of Punjab 
was active in northern part of the country. The combined entity‟s deposits have shown a growth 
of 20 percent, its advances increased by 41.7 percent and the ROA increased to 0.89 percent
5
.  
However, an event study analysis of stock returns revealed that neither of the banks‟ 
shareholders considered the merger as a positive event and the announcement led to deterioration 
in shareholders‟ wealth. It appears that shareholders of both the banks would have preferred a 
merger with a stronger bank and the news of amalgamation with another troubled bank may not 
have been welcomed by the stock markets. 
In sum, results from the event study analysis suggest that in case of voluntary bank mergers 
between a weak and a strong bank, shareholders of the weak bank benefit and those of the strong 
bank lose. However, if both banks are weak (strong) then the merger leads to a fall (rise) in 
shareholder value. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper undertakes an ex ante analysis of bank mergers in India by examining potential costs 
savings from consolidation in public sector banking. Next, we undertake an ex post analysis by 
studying the impact of realized mergers on shareholders‟ wealth. In the ex ante analysis, we 
estimate scale economies and returns to scale which suggest that public sector banks are unlikely 
to achieve cost gains from mergers unless the process is accompanied by branch rationalization. 
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Further, based on these results as well as estimates of cost efficiency, we conclude that cost gains 
may be forthcoming only for the smaller banks and not for bigger banks. Results from profit 
efficiency estimation suggest that mergers are unlikely to bring in immediate improvement in 
profit performance. Thus, mergers would not necessarily be associated with cost or revenue 
benefits; rather if mergers do take place because of other factors, banks have to carefully 
implement the merger exercise (e.g. by closing down redundant branches) in order to achieve 
economic gains. 
Our ex post analysis of shareholders‟ wealth suggests that while forced bank mergers may be 
protecting the interests of depositors, shareholders of both bidder and target banks do not 
perceive any benefits from the merger. Our event study results show that both bidder and target 
banks‟ market value of equity have been eroded upon the announcement of mergers. However, in 
the case of voluntary mergers, the results are mixed. Merger between two strong banks was 
welcomed by the stock markets whereas, merger of two weak banks have not benefited either 
bank‟s shareholders.  
The above results provide important policy implications. The failure of forced mergers to reward 
shareholders suggests that the RBI should activate the mechanism of Prompt Corrective Action 
which would help in identifying a sick bank. Moreove,r the timing of the merger may be 
advanced to avoid a total collapse of the weak bank. This will also help the bidder banks in 
formulating appropriate strategies, which may mitigate the dilution in market value of equity 
consequent upon merger. To ensure the availability of financial services to all segments of the 
population, the RBI needs to approve voluntary mergers conditional upon the disadvantaged 
segments being unaffected by the process and approval should be linked to specific plans offered 
by the acquirers to mitigate the extent of financial exclusion.  
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Table I: Banking Sector in India 
Indicators June March March March 
1969 1993 2003 2005 
Number of Commercial Banks 89 276 292 289 
Public Sector Banks 27 27 27 27 
Private Sector Banks 21 34 30 29 
Regional Rural Banks 0 196 196 196 
Foreign Banks  25 15 35 33 
Non-Scheduled Commercial Banks 16 4 4 4 
     
Number of Bank Offices in India 8262 61169 68500 70373 
(a) Rural 1833 35389 32283 30790 
(b) Semi-Urban 3342 11465 15135 15325 
(c) Urban 1584 8562 11566 12419 
(d) Metropolitan 1503 5753 9516 11839 
Population per Office (in thousands) 64 14 16 16 
Per capita Deposits of Scheduled Commercial 
Banks 
88 3111 12253 16281 
Per capita Credit of Scheduled Commercial 
Banks 
68 1752 7275 10752 
Deposits of Scheduled Commercial Banks as 
Percentage of GNP 
15.5 50.4 58.8 60.2 
(Source: Various Issues of Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Reserve Bank of 
India) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II:  Bank Mergers in India 
Period Number of Mergers 
Pre-nationalization of banks (1961-1968) 46 
Nationalization period (1969-1992) 13 
Post-reform period (1993-2006) 18* 
Total number of mergers 77 
* Includes merger of two development financial institutions 
(Source: Various publications of Reserve Bank of India) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III: Mean values of Scale Economies and Returns to Scale 
This table presents Ray Scale Economies (RSCE) and Returns to Scale (RTS) 
computed from the estimated stochastic cost frontier for all public sector banks. 
Bank level estimates indicate that branches are allowed to expand during the 
estimation and branch level estimates indicate that number of branches is kept 
unchanged. 
Year 
Branches as output Branches excluded 
RSCE RTS RSCE RTS 
1986 1.0345 0.9669 0.8129 1.3055 
1987 1.0338 0.9677 0.8380 1.2048 
1988 1.0339 0.9677 0.8460 1.1974 
1989 1.0281 0.9731 0.8362 1.2083 
1990 1.0268 0.9743 0.8426 1.1992 
1991 1.0254 0.9757 0.8474 1.1915 
1992 1.0335 0.9679 0.8466 1.1930 
1993 1.0433 0.9598 0.8400 1.2105 
1994 1.0459 0.9567 0.8688 1.1643 
1995 1.0497 0.9534 0.8864 1.1417 
1996 1.0574 0.9466 0.8798 1.1495 
1997 1.0582 0.9457 0.8929 1.1313 
1998 1.0593 0.9446 0.8999 1.1220 
1999 1.0599 0.9441 0.9059 1.1151 
2000 1.0584 0.9454 0.9145 1.1045 
2001 1.0659 0.9390 0.9211 1.0965 
2002 1.0556 0.9479 0.9236 1.0933 
2003 1.0564 0.9470 0.9410 1.0724 
  
Table IV: Bank wise Scale Economies and Returns to scale in 2003 
This table presents the same measures as in Table III but at the individual bank level 
for the year 2003 so as to provide a recent snap-shot picture. 
Bank 
Branches as output Branches excluded 
RSCE RTS RSCE RTS 
Sate Bank of India 1.0680 0.9364 1.1582 0.8634 
State Bank of Hyderabad 1.0459 0.9561 0.8886 1.1253 
State Bank of Patiala 1.0270 0.9737 0.8927 1.1203 
State Bank of Travancore 1.0348 0.9664 0.8474 1.1800 
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 1.0517 0.9508 0.9650 1.0362 
State Bank of Mysore 1.0318 0.9692 0.8382 1.1930 
State Bank of Saurashtra 1.0230 0.9775 0.7880 1.2691 
State Bank of Indore 1.0337 0.9674 0.8086 1.2367 
Bank Of Baroda 1.0583 0.9449 1.0001 0.9999 
Punjab National Bank 1.0700 0.9346 1.1204 0.8926 
Bank of India 1.0457 0.9563 0.9555 1.0466 
Canara Bank 1.0365 0.9647 0.9949 1.0051 
Central Bank of India  1.0975 0.9112 1.0726 0.9323 
Union Bank of India 1.0755 0.9298 0.9885 1.0117 
Indian Bank 1.0853 0.9214 0.9444 1.0589 
Indian Overseas Bank 1.0609 0.9426 0.9457 1.0574 
Syndicate Bank 1.0700 0.9345 0.9879 1.0122 
UCO Bank 1.0738 0.9313 0.9588 1.0430 
Allahabad Bank 1.0813 0.9248 1.0183 0.9820 
United Bank of India 1.0931 0.9148 1.0354 0.9658 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 1.0258 0.9748 0.8661 1.1546 
Corporation Bank 1.0362 0.9651 0.8142 1.2281 
Vijaya Bank 1.0641 0.9398 0.8793 1.1373 
Dena Bank 1.0892 0.9181 0.9585 1.0433 
Bank of Maharashtra 1.0481 0.9541 0.9100 1.0989 
Andhra Bank 1.0523 0.9503 0.8743 1.1438 
Punjab & Sind Bank 1.0443 0.9575 0.8957 1.1165 
 
 Table V: Mergers and Profit efficiency 
This table presents cost efficiency and profit efficiency of some banks involved in 
mergers, based on the estimated stochastic cost and profit frontiers for all public 
sector banks. The numbers indicate relative performance of each bank in terms of 
the costs saved or profits obtained in a year as a percentage of that achieved by the 
banks comprising the frontier. The asterisks indicate the year of merger. 
BANK Year Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency 
Allahabad Bank 1989 97.96 73.86 
Allahabad Bank 1990* 97.18 96.97 
Allahabad Bank 1991 97.89 92.98 
Allahabad Bank 1992 96.89 95.44 
Allahabad Bank 1993 97.83 93.13 
Bank of India 1989 94.80 82.64 
Bank of India 1990* 96.00 91.60 
Bank of India 1991 94.69 95.54 
Bank of India 1992 93.32 95.10 
Bank of India 1993 90.15 76.28 
Indian Bank 1989 95.20 77.21 
Indian Bank 1990* 96.04 91.57 
Indian Bank 1991 95.65 93.01 
Indian Bank 1992 95.43 92.95 
Indian Bank 1993 94.12 82.92 
Indian Overseas Bank 1989 89.93 89.03 
Indian Overseas Bank 1990* 93.56 86.01 
Indian Overseas Bank 1991 92.90 92.92 
Indian Overseas Bank 1992 92.96 94.65 
Indian Overseas Bank 1993 89.91 44.99 
Bank Of Baroda 1999 95.73 93.65 
Bank Of Baroda 2000* 95.04 96.63 
Bank Of Baroda 2001 93.83 78.44 
Bank Of Baroda 2002 96.93 81.97 
Bank Of Baroda 2003 95.64 88.20 
Union Bank 1999 96.64 94.75 
Union Bank 2000* 96.21 93.75 
Union Bank 2001 96.57 80.15 
Union Bank 2002 96.93 90.75 
Union Bank 2003 96.35 97.51 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 1997 91.09 96.31 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 1998* 91.72 97.24 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 1999 89.44 96.26 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 2000 87.81 95.20 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 2001 90.33 73.99 
 
  
Table VI: Bank wise Cost and Profit efficiency in 2003 
This table presents the same measures as in Table V but at the individual bank 
level for the year 2003 so as to provide a recent snap-shot picture. 
Bank Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency 
Sate Bank of India 97.03 91.15 
State Bank of Hyderabad 92.52 92.62 
State Bank of Patiala 95.89 94.68 
State Bank of Travancore 90.52 95.91 
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 82.52 84.95 
State Bank of Mysore 92.72 89.14 
State Bank of Saurashtra 87.80 97.14 
State Bank of Indore 94.94 87.61 
Bank Of Baroda 95.64 88.20 
Punjab National Bank 92.84 75.96 
Bank of India 91.71 97.69 
Canara Bank 91.14 93.72 
Central Bank 95.74 75.62 
Union Bank 96.35 97.51 
Indian Bank 83.78 96.45 
Indian Overseas Bank 92.18 81.64 
Syndicate Bank 88.63 77.67 
UCO Bank 90.23 94.74 
Allahabad Bank 93.50 89.81 
United Bank of India 86.75 96.97 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 96.62 85.29 
Corporation Bank 86.24 92.59 
Vijaya Bank 95.10 70.28 
Dena Bank 96.71 82.97 
Bank of Maharashtra 96.36 91.12 
Andhra Bank 96.90 87.28 
Punjab & Sind Bank 93.97 76.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII: Bank Mergers in the post-reform period 
Merger year Target bank Acquirer (or bidders)  Motive  
1993 
New Bank of 
India 
Punjab National Bank 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
1994 
Bank of 
Karad Ltd 
Bank of India 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
1995 
Kashinath 
Seth Bank 
State Bank of India 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
1996 
Punjab Co-op 
Bank Ltd 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
1997 
Bari Doab 
Bank Ltd 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
1999 
Bareilly Corp 
Bank Ltd 
Bank of Baroda 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
1999 
Sikkim Bank 
Ltd 
Union Bank of India 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
2000 
Times Bank 
Ltd 
HDFC Bank Ltd 
Expansion of size-voluntary 
merger 
 2001 
Bank of 
Madura 
ICICI Bank 
Expansion of size-voluntary 
merger 
2002 ICICI Limited ICICI Bank 
Universal banking objective 
(merger of financial 
institution with bank) 
2002 
Benaras State 
Bank Ltd 
Bank of Baroda 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
2003 
Nedungadi 
Bank Ltd 
Punjab National Bank 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
2004 
IDBI Bank 
Limited 
Industrial Development 
Bank of India 
Universal banking 
objective, merger of bank 
with another bank(erstwhile 
FI) 
2004 
South Gujarat 
Local Area 
Bank 
Bank of Baroda 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
2004 
Global Trust 
Bank Ltd 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
 2005 
Centurion 
Bank 
Bank of Punjab 
Expansion of size-voluntary 
merger 
2006 
Ganesh Bank 
of Kurandwad 
Federal Bank 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
2006 
United 
Western Bank 
Industrial Development 
Bank of India 
Restructuring of weak bank- 
forced merger 
2006 
Lord Krishna 
Bank 
Centurion Bank of Punjab 
Expansion of size-voluntary 
merger 
 
Table VIII : Abnormal Returns of  Forced Mergers 
This table depicts the abnormal returns of banks during the window period (-4,4) and the first line below the abnormal 
returns indicates t values based on Mackinlay (1997) corresponding to abnormal returns. The Second line below the 
abnormal returns indicates t-values based on Dodd and Warner (1983) corresponding to abnormal returns.  t-value greater 
than 1.96 indicates significance at  5% level and greater than 2.58 indicates significance at 1% level 
  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Bid Banks                   
ICICI Bank acquired ICICI  2.15% 6.37% 6.45% 3.54% 8.45% 0.13% -4.98% 1.50% 1.19% 
  0.57 1.70 1.72 0.94 2.25 0.03 -1.33 0.40 0.32 
  0.52 1.76 1.63 0.94 2.25 0.00 -1.24 0.42 0.26 
Oriental Bank of Commerce  0.50% -0.59% 
-
1.63% -0.16% -6.46% -1.88% -2.23% -2.95% -1.38% 
  0.18 -0.21 -0.58 -0.06 -2.30 -0.67 -0.79 -1.05 -0.49 
  0.18 -0.21 -0.58 -0.06 -2.29 -0.67 -0.79 -1.05 -0.49 
Federal Bank  
-
1.03% 3.44% 
-
1.80% 0.36% -0.30% -0.61% -0.88% -0.32% 2.37% 
  -0.48 1.59 -0.83 0.17 -0.14 -0.28 -0.41 -0.15 1.10 
  -0.47 1.58 -0.83 0.17 -0.14 -0.28 -0.41 -0.15 1.09 
PNB  0.38% -0.55% 
-
1.33% -2.05% -0.17% 0.08% -2.25% -0.90% -1.59% 
  0.18 -0.25 -0.61 -0.94 -0.08 0.04 -1.04 -0.41 -0.73 
  0.18 -0.25 -0.61 -0.94 -0.08 0.04 -1.03 -0.41 -0.73 
IDBI acquired IDBI Bank 2.22% 4.98% 
-
1.68% -3.62% -3.69% -1.72% 0.38% 1.42% -2.69% 
  0.40 0.89 -0.30 -0.64 -0.66 -0.31 0.07 0.25 -0.48 
  0.51 1.14 -0.38 -0.83 -0.84 -0.39 0.09 0.33 -0.62 
IDBI acquired United 
Western Bank 2.60% -1.17% 5.90% 3.84% -2.95% 0.09% 2.16% 8.56% 4.26% 
  1.03 -0.46 2.33 1.51 -1.16 0.03 0.85 3.38 1.68 
  1.02 -0.46 2.32 1.51 -1.16 0.03 0.85 3.36 1.68 
Target Banks                   
ICICI Limited  
-
0.54% 5.78% 8.74% 4.95% -9.20% 2.26% -3.09% 1.47% -0.98% 
  -0.18 1.87 2.83 1.60 -2.98 0.73 -1.00 0.48 -0.32 
  -0.17 1.87 2.82 1.60 -2.97 0.73 -1.00 0.48 -0.32 
Nedugundi Bank   
-
4.83% 
-
11.04% 0.88% 0.49% -1.09% 3.43% 14.79% 
-
22.67% 
-
22.56% 
  -1.24 -2.82 0.22 0.13 -0.28 0.88 3.78 -5.79 -5.77 
  -0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.15 -0.23 -0.22 
IDBI Bank  1.54% -3.37% 
-
1.08% -5.08% 0.07% 0.75% 1.58% -2.25% -0.44% 
  0.52 -1.13 -0.36 -1.70 0.02 0.25 0.53 -0.76 -0.15 
  0.51 1.14 -0.38 -0.83 -0.84 -0.39 0.09 0.33 -0.62 
Global Trust Bank 
-
3.19% 1.91% 
-
0.64% 
-
23.07% 
-
112.79% 
-
32.26% -1.35% 1.95% 12.05% 
  -0.67 0.40 -0.13 -4.81 -23.51 -6.72 -0.28 0.41 2.51 
  -0.67 0.47 -0.16 -5.68 -27.76 -7.95 -0.33 0.48 2.97 
United Western Bank  3.11% 0.82% 
-
1.00% 0.08% 2.69% 0.46% -0.05% 0.39% 0.14% 
  0.72 0.19 -0.23 0.02 0.63 0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.03 
  1.06 0.28 -0.34 0.03 0.92 0.16 -0.02 0.13 0.05 
 
Table IX : Abnormal Returns of  Voluntary Mergers 
This table depicts the abnormal returns of banks during the window period (-4, 4) and the first line 
below the abnormal returns indicates t values based on Mackinlay (1997) corresponding to abnormal 
returns. The Second line below the abnormal returns indicates t-values based on Dodd and Warner 
(1983) corresponding to abnormal returns.  t-value greater than 1.96 indicates significance at  5% level 
and greater than  2.58 indicates significance at 1% level 
  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Bid Banks                   
HDFC Bank 0.02% 3.14% 
-
4.21% -1.08% 8.34% 8.89% 7.97% 5.33% 6.17% 
  0.01 1.23 -1.65 -0.42 3.27 3.49 3.13 2.09 2.42 
  0.28 47.62 -63.88 -16.37 126.60 134.53 121.23 80.99 93.39 
ICICI Bank 
acquired Bank of 
Madura 
-
0.02% 3.22% 0.84% 11.40% -3.28% 
-
3.08% 
-
0.95% 
-
0.49% 1.60% 
  0.00 0.83 0.22 2.93 -0.84 -0.79 -0.24 -0.13 0.41 
  0.00 0.82 0.21 2.63 -0.84 -0.78 -0.24 -0.12 0.41 
Centurion Bank  
-
0.85% 
-
0.26% 0.84% 0.92% -6.48% 
-
2.24% 1.67% 
-
0.15% 1.06% 
  -0.27 -0.08 0.27 0.29 -2.06 -0.71 0.53 -0.05 0.34 
  -0.27 -0.08 0.26 0.29 -2.04 -0.71 0.53 -0.05 0.34 
Target Banks                   
Times Bank  
-
1.41% 1.16% 0.89% -3.43% 21.09% 
-
1.18% 
-
1.42% 9.14% 
-
0.11% 
  -0.44 0.36 0.28 -1.07 6.59 -0.37 -0.44 2.86 -0.03 
  -0.43 0.35 0.27 -1.04 6.36 -0.35 -0.42 2.76 -0.03 
Bank of Madura  7.97% 7.79% 7.74% 7.76% 7.91% 7.88% 7.90% 8.02% 8.05% 
  1.98 1.93 1.92 1.92 1.96 1.95 1.96 1.99 1.99 
  1.96 1.92 1.91 1.92 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.97 1.98 
Bank of Punjab  
-
0.67% 7.01% 0.00% -0.40% -8.85% 0.00% 
-
1.39% 0.15% 1.50% 
  -0.18 1.87 0.00 -0.11 -2.36 0.00 -0.37 0.04 0.40 
  -0.18 1.86 0.00 -0.11 -2.35 0.00 -0.37 0.04 0.40 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Abnormal Return of Bid Banks: Forced Mergers 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Abnormal Return of Target Banks: Forced Mergers 
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Figure 3: Abnormal Return of Bid Banks: Voluntary Mergers 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Abnormal Return of Bid Banks: Forced Mergers 
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